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Introduction
The World Bank and the European Commission have issued a two-volume study entitled Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia - Breaking with the Past: The Path to Stability and Growth. This lengthy document,
about 450 pages in total, is apparently a strategy of transition and development. I say apparently because
the focus, as the title indicates, is limited to stability and growth. Indeed, as will be pointed out below, even
the achievement of these two goals is treated with some caution and modesty.
In the first volume, the main goals and instruments are determined. Details by sectors are given in the
second volume. The study is to serve as background material for the donorsÕ conference, indeed, for a series
of donorsÕ conferences in the period till 2004. The first one, to be held in Brussels on June 29th, should con-
sider the FRY financing needs for the year 2001. This covers roughly what the authors call the short—term.
The medium—term financing needs should be addressed later and should cover the period from 2002 to
2004. The study discuses the long-term development, i.e., till 2010, but only in general terms and with no
precise calculations for the needs for specific financial aid and assistance. 
By Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) only Serbia and Montenegro are meant. Kosovo is not includ-
ed as it is under a different donorsÕ programme (some statistical information, as that of GDP, does include
Kosovo however). The paper does not go into the constitutional and political issues, though it is noted that
significant changes are to be expected which would most probably imply the need to adjust the programme
contained in this study. In general, no political economic preconditions for the realisation of this programme
are considered at all.
This study is wide-ranging and should be studied carefully. In this short essay, only the key strategic
idea is discussed. 
The Main Goals
There are two sets of goals that the strategy is aiming to achieve. One is contained in the title itself and
consists of stability and growth. The other is a more concrete one and consists of three aims:
(i) restoring macroeconomic stability and external balance;
(ii) stimulating growth and creating the basis for a sustainable supply response, and;
(iii) improving the social well being of the most vulnerable and building human capacity.
FRY 2000 2000 V 2001 V 2001 V 2001 I-V 2001
Basic Economic Indicators 1999 IV 2001 V 2000 I-V 2000
GDP growth, in real 1994 pricesa) É 8.4% É É É É
Industrial Production É 10.9% É 0.0% -6.0% -2.4%
Montenegro É 3.7% É 12.7% 17.8% 2.9%
Serbia É 11.4% É -0.8% -7.3% -2.6%
Central Serbia É 12.0% É -4.8% -11.3% -6.1%
Vojvodina É 10.1% É 7.9% 1.3% 5.3%
Average Wage - Serbia, in DM 93 -11.2% 150 -0.8% 68.9% 72.0%
Unemployment Rate 28.45% É 30.1% É É É
Montenegro ... É 40.0% É É É
Serbia 27.60% É 29.0% É É É
Current account, in USD millions -1,298 3.2% É É É É
Trade balance, in USD millions -1,989 -10.6% -225 13.4% 31.6% 13.3%
Export - USD million 1,713 15.0% 117 -20.5% -19.8% 7.2%
Montenegro 157 31.1% 5 -64.0% -63.6% -1.6%
Serbia 1,411 13.8% 112 -16.1% -14.6% 8.6%
Import - USD million 3,662 12.6% 343 -1.1% 7.9% 10.8%
Montenegro 313 -1.0% 3 -29.1% -88.3% -74.4%
Serbia 3,035 15.6% 338 0.9% 18.1% 19.8%
Monetary supply (M1), end of period, in DIN billion 29.6 60.7% 41.0 10.7% 117.0% 96.2%
Cash 10.3 39.8% 13.6 10.2% 128.9% 85.2%
Deposits 19.3 74.9% 27.4 11.0% 111.6% 102.1%
Real money supply, end of period, in DM million 1,043 -26.7% 1,366 10.7% 97.0% 69.7%
Hard Currency Reserve, end of period, in USD million 524 76.2% 661 8.9% É É
Discount Rate É É 1.00% 0.0% -50.0% -30.0%
Market interest rate, monthly level 5.84% 37.3% 5.04% -0.8% -7.2% 6.9%
Retail prices - Serbia É 70.0% É 1.9% 120.0% 116.8%
Cost of living - Serbia É 79.6% É 3.5% 125.2% 118.4%
Industrial producer prices - Serbia É 102.6% É 3.2% 115.9% 122.3%
Black market exchange rate (din/DM) 25.45 103.2% 30.40 0.3% 34.0% 36.4%
a) Data refers to FRY without Kosovo.
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If these two sets of goals are consolidated, the strategy could be said to aim at stability, sustained growth
and increasing welfare and capacity. It is to be noted that the goals that were prominent in previous tran-
sition strategies — e.g., market economy, functioning democracy, open society — are not singled out here.
Indeed, some of them appear, in one way or another, among the instruments, i.e., among the reforms that
are necessary in order to achieve the chosen goals. Apart from the goals chosen not being the usual tran-
sitional ones, they are not really developmental ones either. Thus, it is not altogether easy to determine the
genre of this document, so to speak.
The Main Instruments
Most generally, there are just two instruments the strategy relies on: international support and domestic
reforms. In a nutshell, international aid, assistance and investments should be supportive of comprehensive
reforms and both together should be conducive to the achievement of the above set goals.
The external financial contribution has been set at more than USD 1.2 billion for the rest of 2001 and
at more than USD 2.6 billion for the 2002-2004 period, or at about USD 3.9 billion for the whole period. Its
targets are divided in three groups, i.e., macroeconomic management, promotion of growth and social
development, which roughly overlap with the three goals indicated above. Among the sources of the finan-
cial support in 2001, the dominant ones are those that aim at covering the so-called recurrent costs and tech-
nical assistance as well as investments and credits (they are more or less divided equally between these two
groups). 
The Expected Outcome
Yugoslav economy should grow about 4% per year on average till 2010. With such growth performance,
in 2010 Yugoslavia should reach 80% of its 1989 GDP. In 2010, GDP should be about USD 25 billion or
about USD 2500 per capita at most (at most because in this calculation Kosovo is included and population
growth in Kosovo has been high in the past).
Investment should be higher than domestic savings by about 8% of GDP in 2010 (i.e., foreign financing
needs should be around USD 2 billion in that year). The difference between investment and domestic sav-
ings is much higher in the years preceding 2010. That means that foreign investment during the whole
decade should, as a rule, be somewhere around USD 2 billion per year.
Public expenditures should be somewhere between 45% of GDP at the end of the period and 48% of
GDP in the first half of the period (i.e., in the period ending with the last year of this programme, which is
2004), with the deficit being somewhere between 4% of GDP at the end and 8% of GDP in the first half of
the period. The main sources of finance of the deficit should be foreign grants, credits and investments. 
Current account deficit should go down from around 6-9% of GDP in the first half of the period to slight-
ly less than 5% in 2010. Debt to GDP ratio should vary somewhere between 75%, 78% and 71%. However,
the debt service to export ratio should increase from 7% at the beginning of the period to around 25% at
the end of the period.
Retail prices inflation according to this programme should decelerate steadily from 35% in 2001 to 5%
in 2010.
An Assessment
The study, in its second volume, is very detailed and puts down almost every aspect of development
and transition reform, at least in the area of macro- and microeconomics. There is no point in going into
details of these reform suggestions. They are all standard. Perhaps the key assessment is whether "the path"
is to "stability and growth" as desired.
The first question is what kind of a path is being charted? This is easily summarised. The path is one of
rather high twin deficits — fiscal and current account deficit - over the whole coming decade that must be
covered by foreign financial support of various kinds.
From this, the first critical assessment can be made: this is a rather long path to stability. Unlike in most
other cases in which macroeconomic stability was taken as a precondition for sustainable growth, here the
major sources of macroeconomic instability are tolerated for the period of about ten years.
This could be seen as justifiable if the expected outcome would be high GDP growth. However, the
projected growth is rather modest, because it is constrained by these same high deficits. In other words, the
programme does not really deliver stability during the period under consideration and the programmed and
contained instability stands in the way of rapid growth. If the financial support of the required kind and
amount does not materialise, and the study repeatedly argues that the USD 3.9 billion planned for the whole
2001-2004 period are the bare minimum of what is required, than this growth, though not all that impres-
sive, would not be sustainable.
The twin deficits are expected to persist for two reasons. On one hand, as it has already been pointed
out, Yugoslavia will have to service a rather high foreign debt even if the currently existing stock of debt is
rescheduled at the best possible terms.
On the other hand, and perhaps more importantly, the fiscal deficit is expected to persist because of the
realisation of the third main objective, that of increasing social welfare and development of capacity. In the
next ten years no radical reform of public expenditures is envisaged, at least as far as their level is con-
cerned. With public expenditures close to 50% of GDP, it is obvious that the tax burden will have to be high
even if foreign aid is exceptionally generous. That will sap growth apart from straining stability, though it
will probably just sustain rather than lift the existing level of welfare.
A question may be raised why is this type of a programme preferred to a more radical one with a more
decisive stress on macroeconomic stability and more far-reaching institutional reforms? This may be based
on the implicit evaluation of the public governance capacities and of political stability in Yugoslavia in gen-
eral. If true, this would also imply an existence of an implicit judgement that Yugoslavia is more of an aid
dependent than of a promising transition state and economy.
What does the programme leave the country with?
The final question is what will the country look like after ten years of pursuing this programme? It will
still be quite poor and it will be burdened with significant internal and external deficits. It is impossible to
assess at this moment whether it will be able to sustain these deficits or will have to rely on foreign sup-
port for years to come after this programme expires. The suspicion is that its economy will end up using a
lot of foreign money for modest development achievements and will still end up as not being self-sustain-
able. It would not be bad, especially in view of the not insignificant dangers of aid-dependency, to chart an
alternative programme with more decisive stress on macroeconomic stability and with more radical institu-
tional and policy reforms.
Standard model of
international support
& domestic reform
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The Lessons of Previous Transitions1
Transition from a socialist to a market economy has been proceeding in most countries of Eastern and
Central Europe for over ten years now. Yugoslavia and Serbia seriously embarked upon the process of
transition only nine months ago. The ten-year delay quite certainly represents an enormous loss for
Serbia. However, the only positive thing about this delay could perhaps be the possibility to learn from
the mistakes of others. As people say, "wise people learn from the experiences of others, while fools learn
from their own experiences". Unfortunately, we somehow failed to realize in time where the anachronous
national-communist regime of Slobodan Miloäevi was taking us. At that point, we obviously learned
nothing from the experiences of Albania under Enver Hoxha or Romania under Nikolae Ceausescu. Also
largely responsible for this was the Serbian intelligentsia, rallied around the Serbian Academy of Sciences
and Arts, which, instead of sciences and arts, dealt with the drawing of maps and resettling of popula-
tions in the best tradition of the 19th century. Even the economists in this Academy focused more on fan-
tasies about which republic stole more from other republics, than on true economics. For this reason,
now, when we are entering the process of transition, we must not allow ourselves once again the luxu-
ry of learning from our own mistakes.
This article will present what I consider to be a resume of the basic lessons in transition. Of course,
it is far easier to describe than to explain what it is that needs to be done. However, becoming aware of
the goal that is aspired to represents the first and necessary step towards its realization. Without a goal
and vision, we are sentenced to wandering in the dark.
The main relationship determining the success of transition is the relationship between the following
four "parameters": macroeconomic stability, privatization, social policy and political stability. Let us take
a look at several "axioms" for successful transition.
Macroeconomic stability is not the goal, but the means 
Due to the effects of "market fundamentalism" or a dogmatic vision of reality, and also under the influ-
ence of international organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank, the goals and the means were
inverted in a large number of countries in transition. Macroeconomic stability, reflected in price stability,
avoidance of a fiscal deficit, and an excessive balance-of-payments [foreign] deficit, is undoubtedly
extremely important, but it is not the goal of an economic policy — it is its means. This means that macro-
economic stability is a condition without which companies and entrepreneurs are unable rationally to do
business (since they do not know, for instance, what the prices will be like in a month or two), or to
make investments (since a devaluation can destroy a profitable investment overnight). However, macro-
economic stability is not a goal of the economic policy. A goal of the economic policy is an increase in
employment and the populationÕs real income.
How did the goal and the means come to be mixed up? I believe that two things led to this. First of
all, a number of economists (especially in former socialist countries), shifting from one extreme to anoth-
er, went straight from Marxism to extreme laissez-faire. Thus, for instance, Gaidar, "the father of Russian
reforms" and the first Russian (post-Soviet) prime minister was once the editor of the theoretical maga-
zine "Bolshevik", only later to become a loud advocate of "market fundamentalism" and even a support-
er of Pinoche. Since most economists (whether they belonged to the left-wing, center or right-wing) were
unable to implement their ideas while the communists were in power, their theoretical zeal never had an
opportunity to face real life and, thus, to be corrected. The moment they received this opportunity they,
of course, used it to apply their "market fundamentalism", forgetting that economics is about fine bal-
ancing between economic and political requests, and that "fundamentalism", both on the left and the right
wing, cannot succeed in the real world. What is more, as the "fundamentalists" had no serious profes-
sional or political opposition in the beginning, since the only real opposition coming from the former
communists was discredited, and they threw every other opposition into the same basket with commu-
nism, the "fundamentalists" did not have to take into account (as they would have in every democratic
state) the opinion or interest of the other side, meaning also those who were to lose from the reforms. 
The second favorable element for "fundamentalism" was the support it received from abroad. Foreign
consultants or international organizations (IMF and World Bank) would never be able to apply such an
extreme economic policy — where the means and goal are inverted — in strong democratic countries or
countries where there existed relatively large economic knowledge. Thus, for instance, it would be
unimaginable, in a "normal" country, after ten years of a constant drop in the social product, like in
Ukraine or Moldavia, to continue to advocate those same, totally unsuccessful models of transition.
However, if that someone does not have to face angry workers or pensioners, it is, of course easy and
ideologically very simple for him (since this requires no additional mental effort) to continue to advocate
market fundamentalism, even if it produces such negative results. In other words, consultants are not
politicians and they did not have to face political reality. Nevertheless, the weakness of the economic pro-
fession in most East European countries meant that their economists (except in countries like Hungary
and Poland) were unable to formulate alternative economic reform programs. This can best be seen
through a comparison of the international communitiesÕ attitude to countries in transition and Asian coun-
1 Text prepared for the opening of the G17 Institute, on June 25, 2001
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tries in the midst of their crisis in 1998. The IMFÕs extreme solutions were modified or rejected in South
Korea and Malaysia. These countriesÕ links to influential business and political circles in America also
meant that international organizations were unable to lay the responsibility for the failure of reforms on
slow or "inconsistent" reforms in these countries. However, the weakness and corruption of power-hold-
ers in East European countries opened up the possibility for the blame for the failure of reforms always
to be laid on domestic protagonists and their alleged inconsistency in carrying out reforms.
The best examples of an inversion of the goals and means are Moldavia and Bulgaria. Even though
both countries have maintained macroeconomic stability for a number of years now, the economic situ-
ation is catastrophic. Moldavia has been registering a drop in the social product for a whole decade now.
Such a situation would lead to major social unrest and would be politically absolutely unacceptable in
any West European country. A similar, albeit less dramatic situation, is the one in Bulgaria, whose econ-
omy regularly registers two or three year growth, and then just as long a drop. The failure to understand
the difference between the goal and the means has resulted in political instability in both countries and,
thus, the undermining of the reforms as well. The communists returned to power in Moldavia at the last
elections, while Bulgaria just recently saw the victory of a nebulous coalition of the dissatisfied, rallied
around former Emperor Simeon II, whose goals and ability to carry out reforms are totally vague.
Almost half a century ago, German economist Eucken said that "economic stability is not everything,
but that without it, everything is nothing". Fortunately, we have, I hope, finally learned the second part
of his thought on our own skin, since we experienced probably the largest hyperinflation in world his-
tory, something MiloäeviÕs regime bestowed on us. Therefore, I believe it is highly unlikely that we will
repeat the same experience. But, we now need to "master" the first part of EuckenÕs statement — namely,
that "economic stability is not everything", i.e. that macroeconomic stability is not a goal in itself, but a
means necessary for improving social and individual well-being.
The speed of privatization is not important; the development of the private sector is
The main lesson in privatization could be epitomized as follows: "better a little, but good, than a lot,
but bad". Here too we can learn from the bad example of the Russian reforms, especially Russian priva-
tization. Apart from economic fundamentalism, which we have just spoken of, the Russian reformists
insisted on the importance of the speed of privatization, emphasizing that it is only in this case that the
changes would be irreversible. In other words, if privatization is procrastinated, the communists, who
could return to power at any moment, would halt the entire process and there would be no transition.
Such an attitude was reflected in the famous statement by Gaidar and Fyodorov about the reform gov-
ernment resembling "kamikazes" who were ready to sacrifice themselves, or more precisely their power,
in order to carry out privatization as soon as possible. It is possible that a certain number of reformists
truly did believe this, but it is obvious that the power and political strength of the communists was over-
rated. Not in a single case has their return to power (mostly as social democrats) resulted in the rever-
sion of the wheel of history, to the nationalization of ownership.
However, lying behind the logic of speedy privatization (apart from fear of a communist counter-rev-
olution) were two other reasons. The first one was of a "fundamentalist" nature and was reflected in the
view that (applying the Coase theorem) it is unimportant how ownership is distributed, i.e. who is to
become rich in the "primary accumulation". Namely, when private ownership is secure, it is in the new
ownersÕ interest, no matter how they had acquired these assets, to act responsibly, i.e. to maximize their
own gain, and thus also "guided by an invisible hand", the gain of the society as a whole. As we know,
this did not happen. New owners turned out to be ready to destroy and sell off the companies, take the
money and, often, flee abroad (e.g. Gusinsky and Berezovsky). Of course, this can be explained by the
fact that the companyÕs discount rate was very low and that, between the uncertain and laborious work
of improving the efficiency of the companies they had obtained for a mere trifle, and their sale and flight
abroad, they chose the easier option.
The second reason was that speedy privatization, carried out in a "shady" manner, was in the inter-
est of the powerful layers of society in those countries. At issue here is, in a way, specializing in a spe-
cific talent (a comparative advantage). Those who are talented in making gains through political connec-
tions will usually not have talent as true business entrepreneurs. As Kornai pointed out, already at the
very beginning of transition, capitalism is a society that develops organically, so that "market bolshevism"
which addressed the issue of "building capitalism" in the same manner as "building socialism", on the
basis of the "gung-ho" principle, is unsuitable and cannot produce good results. This is precisely why
Kornai insisted on relatively slow privatization, considering it far more important to stimulate entrepre-
neurs so that a true ("organic", and not false) private sector would develop as fast as possible. The expe-
riences of Hungary and Poland — two countries that laid emphasis on the development of a new private
sector, and not on the speed of the privatization of the existing socialists companies — show that Kornai
was right. Mihail Arandarenko was of a similar opinion, stressing that instead of a paradigm of primary
accumulation, which was (implicitly) advocated by the "fundamentalists", there was more reason to speak
of a paradigm of Max WeberÕs "political capitalism", according to which political influence provides for
economic success. The battle is, therefore, waged for political influence — so as to make gains and wealth.
Unlike Hungary and Poland, we have seen this kind of "political capitalism" in Ukraine, Russia and most
countries of the former Soviet Union. That it precisely why in "partnership-type" or "mafia-type" capital-
ism entrepreneurs do not have much in common with true businesspeople, since they are actually entre-
preneurs in the political sphere. In efficient capitalism, the goal of entrepreneurs is better and efficient
production, since this provides for larger profit. In "mafia-type" capitalism, the goal of entrepreneurs is to
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establish political connections, since this is the way to become rich.
And finally, such shady privatizations are not only fatal for economic efficiency. First of all, instead
of most of the population turning to entrepreneurship and trying either to work more or create some-
thing new, the populationÕs energy is concentrated on the distribution of the already produced wealth.
In other words, instead of thinking about what to produce and how to work better, I am using my ener-
gy to find political connections in order to get hold of a small portion of the already existing national
wealth. Secondly, as such distribution can be the "winning number" for only a small number of people,
since the national wealth is too small in order for, letÕs say, several million people to have some direct
benefit from privatization, the fact that a small layer of the population has become rich, while a majority
has gained nothing, has its political repercussions. Instead of most of the population supporting privati-
zation, it is rejected and viewed as plunder — "privatization" in the well-known Russian version. Instead
of people voting for the reformists, they are accused of stealing, due to which socialist and populist par-
ties return to the scene. Therefore, such privatization directly undermines political stability.
A social policy is no solution 
Very often, even here in this country, expectations from social policy are high, and unrealistic goals
are placed before it. While the first wave of "market fundamentalists" had no interest in the social poli-
cy, the second waveÕs interest was enormous — but for the wrong reasons.
Namely, they knew that the implementation of a policy of economic stability as a goal in itself, and
a speedy and non-transparent privatization in the interest of a small number of people led to large social
disruptions: the non-payment of wages or pensions, unemployment, high interest rates that do not allow
the development of a new private sector and so on. However, without abandoning these goals, they trans-
ferred the task of reducing social tensions onto social policy. In other words, "we will continue with our
plunder, but, through some type of redistribution, you should create the kind of situation in which even
the poor would get some pittance and stay calm".
This is, of course, absolutely, impossible. When a society is poor — and it quite certainly is poor when
the social product and the populationÕs real income continue to drop, while unemployment is on the rise
— the state is poor too, and there are simply no funds for a social policy. Let us compare Germany and
the Congo. Poverty is, quite certainly, far greater in the Congo. Is there any social policy and support to
the poor there? No, not because it is unnecessary, but because there are no funds for this. Only rich coun-
tries can allow themselves to care about the poor.
That is why the social policy and social spending must correspond to the countryÕs economic possi-
bilities. It would be an illusion to expect the social policy here, with an income of a thousand dollars per
capita — at the level achieved already thirty years ago — to be able to resolve social tensions. The best
social policy, at our income level, is economic growth and the reduction of unemployment. It this fails
to be achieved, there will be no funds from which to help the poorest.
Without economic stability there is no political stability, and vice-versa 
Economic stability is not the same as macroeconomic stability. Economic stability is macroeconomic
stability plus economic growth. This means that without this we are unlikely to enter a period of politi-
cal stability. For this reason it is growth and nothing but growth, following a two-decade period in which
Serbia first stagnated (from 1980 to 1989), only for its real income to plunge by almost half (from 1990 to
the present), represents an absolute imperative for successful transition and political stability.
But, true is also the opposite — that without political stability it is not possible to achieve economic
stability. If we prolong indefinitely the present situation of unsettled relations between Montenegro and
Serbia, unclear competencies of federal bodies vis--vis bodies of the Republic of Serbia, a continued con-
flict with the worldÕs most powerful countries (with the further possibility of their constant blackmail),
any serious foreign capital is unlikely to enter Serbia. The belief that every, even the smallest problem is
resolved either with secession, or autonomy, or early elections, shows a lack of the political protagonistsÕ
maturity. Instead of patiently negotiating, without raising political tensions, and through agreements, polit-
ical parties and their leaders, with their theatrical moves or the further creation of small states in the
Balkans (mostly to appease their own vanity) are objectively working on the further destabilization of the
region and on driving foreign capital away. For this reason, the Serbian prime minister was right when
he described some of these projects as anachronous, and others as frivolous, and when he pointed out
that we needed several years of political stability. Without political stability, which also implies a stable
government for at least a few years, and not constant elections and new coalitions, it is ridiculous to
expect economic stability.
However, it is just as unrealistic to expect a policy of non-transparent privatization (for which there
are many indications) or a possible policy of "market fundamentalism" to lead to political stabilization.
Such a wrong economic policy will produce greater dissatisfaction among the population (especially since
the expectations are very high), it will result in the inability of the social policy to reduce this dissatis-
faction (simply because there will be no funds for this purpose), and finally in political instability, and
the serious possibility of the socialists (in new, post-Miloäevi attire) or nebulous populists returning to
the political scene. It will be very difficult for us to avoid the fate of the states around us — Bulgaria,
Romania, Macedonia — but if we are aware of the problems awaiting us, we can at least try. The task of
the G 17 Institute, as I see it, is to point to such challenges, criticize the authorities when, in our opin-
ion, they are conducting bad policy and to define, as much as possible, the ways in which to avoid "the
traps of transition".
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Prices and Wages
The growth of retail prices in Serbia in May was 1.9%. A key element of this growth was a 22.2% increase
in the prices of agricultural products. The consumer price index in Serbia was up just over 3.5%, month-on-
month. Following a new adjustment of the price of electricity, June inflation will register a somewhat higher
rate. Due to yet another correction to the prices of electricity by the end of the year, it is possible to expect
inflation at around 45%. Of course, it must be underlined that transferred inflation accounts for a large por-
tion of this.
Net wages in Serbia in May (4,497) compared to April 2001, were down nominally by 0.8%. Expressed
in German marks, April wages were worth 150 DEM. The real purchasing power of wages in May (nominal
wages deflated by the consumer price index) dropped by 2.6%. In relation to the same month last year
(expressed in DEM), the average wage was up 68.9%, while
nominal wages deflated by the consumer price index, observed
in relation to the same month last year, decreased by 5.4%. The
wage average for the first five months of this year was 72%
higher compared to the same period last year. As of the next
issue, we will be transferring to the new methodology of cal-
culating wages. In the previous system of net wages, 1.05 dinars
worth of dues were paid on each dinar of the wage. In reality,
the burden was smaller due to the non-taxable part (other forms
of payments to employees). According to the finance ministryÕs
estimates, the actual burden was around 0.77 dinars. The new
gross wages concept lowers this level to 0.70 dinars worth of
dues.
Apart from the usual IMFÕs request for limiting the expan-
sion of net domestic credit (based on monetary presence in the
balance of payments), wages in the state sector (state bodies
and companies) will be used as a nominal anchor.
Output 
Industrial output in the FRY in May 2001 remained at the same level as in the preceding month. Output
in Montenegro increased by 12.7%, and dropped in Serbia by 0.8%. In Central Serbia, output drop was 4.8%,
while Vojvodina registered growth of 7.9%. The deseasonalized index for May shows a 2.5% drop relative to
April. Such a trend of industrial output can be explained by the negative impact of the imposition of hard
budget constraints and the change of relative prices. In the changed environment, some companies are
inevitably reducing their production.
Industrial output in the FRY in May 2001 dropped by 6.0% compared to the same month last year under
the influence of the same seasonal factors. Output in Montenegro increased by 17.8%, and dropped in Serbia
by 7.3%. The output drop in central Serbia was 11.3%, while the growth in Vojvodina is 1.3%.
The adoption of the Privatization Law and accompanying regulations has created conditions for the
process of restructuring the Serbian economy. Apart from this, it is also necessary to establish mechanisms
for supervising and monitoring income and spending in eight of the largest state-owned companies which
employ 6% of the labor force. The salaries in the companies where they are 20% above the republican aver-
age have been frozen. Apart from the rationalization of spending, the goal is to enable the rest of the econ-
omy to obtain cheap raw materials. 
The level of industrial output is stagnating, but this sector was not expected to have a crucial role in con-
tributing to the growth rate this year.
Foreign trade and the foreign currency exchange
rate
In May, Serbia exported goods worth USD 112 million, and
exported at the value of USD 338 million. Compared to April
2000, exports were up 0.9%. Over the first five months of 2001,
average exports increased by 8.6%, and imports increased by
19.8% compared to the average in the first five months of 2000.
Since a surplus of the balance of services is expected this year
as well, the current account will register a somewhat smaller
deficit. The expected current account deficit (without taking
donations into account) will be around USD 1.8 billion, i.e.
17.5% of the official projected GDP.
The foreign currency exchange continued to depreciate in
real terms. The two main arguments of the National Bank of
Yugoslavia (NBJ) for maintaining this trend is the checking of
inflationary expectations and the further existence of a sufficient
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level of competitiveness of domestic companies, based on historical levels of the real exchange rate. In May
(prior to the latest waves of price hikes caused by higher prices of electricity), the real hard currency exchange
rate was at the level of 1998 or the beginning of 1996. A comparison of retail prices and the hard currency
exchange rate is only one way to express the real hard currency exchange rate. If we were to use only the
prices of exchangeable assets (which, for instance, do not include municipal services, which considerably
increased this year) or to use only wages for the following period, the situation would be somewhat differ-
ent, i.e. more favorable. The mentioned figure concerning wages expressed in dinars corroborates this stand.
In the upcoming months, one should expect a further slow nominal depreciation of the dinar against the
DEM. A potential danger is the slow adaptation of trade to these changes. Furthermore, such a policy must
take into account the fact that the beginning of the settlement of the foreign debt implies a prepared exit strat-
egy in case the mentioned slow nominal depreciation is resorted to by the end of the year.
Money, Public Revenues and Expenditures 
At the end of May, the M1 monetary aggregate was 41.7 billion dinars. The share of cash at the end of
May was 13.6 billion dinars, i.e. 33.1%. After keeping the discount rate at the level of 1% for three months,
the National Bank of Yugoslavia (NBJ), guided by the trends of prices and interest, decided to raise the dis-
count rate to 1.9%. The discount rate has been negative in real terms since last October, with the exception
of March. The banksÕ weighted active interest rate on short-term credits was 4.19% at the end of May, while
the interest rate was 5.04% on the money market. These interest rates are still relatively high.
At the end of May, the NBJÕs disposable hard currency reserves still fully covered the money supply — the
coverage coefficient was 1.11, after which, with the new inflow of hard currency reserves due to the resolu-
tion of the issue of succession, this coefficient grew considerably. The level of hard currency reserves at the
end of May provided for two months of imports on the average, while the total reserves (NBJ + commercial
banks) made possible three months of imports.
Until recently, the exceptionally low monetization level and the use of foreign currency limited the pos-
sibility of monetary financing. Furthermore, the change in the structure of the money supply (the reduced
share of cash) lowers the possibility of tax evasion. Confidence in the dinar is still being established, but the
main sources of the growth of net foreign assets, i.e. hard currency reserves, are the inflow of foreign assis-
tance, a moderate level of imports and the transfer of hard currency transactions from the gray to the legal
market.
The gross collection of public revenues is increasing. A total of 23.4 billion dinars (8.9% more than in the
preceding month) were collected. The republican budget collected 8.75 billion dinars worth of revenues. This
represents a significant increase relative to budgetary revenues in the period prior to the fiscal reform, but a
large part of the public revenues (around 40%) in the previous system was financed through special off-bud-
get accounts, so that the growth rates can be taken only conditionally. Following the stabilization of public
revenues, Serbia must now resolve the problem of the quasi-fiscal deficit. The quasi-fiscal deficit represents
the main obstacle to the establishment of macroeconomic stability. There are two time dimensions of this
deficit — resolving the existing and preventing the accumula-
tion of a future deficit. Among the elements of this deficit,
apart from the outstanding debts to the budget, are also the
losses in public companies. The reduction of the deficit in
these companies is carried out through a policy of price
adjustment, the abolition of soft financing and the reduction of
business costs. There are a number of examples in support of
this thesis. The NBJ did not grant the usual credits to the agri-
cultural sector, the effected and planned increases in the prices
of municipal services and electricity, and the reduction of the
Electric Power CompanyÕs (EPS) costs resulting from costs for
employeesÕ wages.
The gradual adjustment of the price of electricity, which is
higher than announced in the first quarter, resulted in a high-
er inflation rate, but it was, at the same time, a request of the
IMF. The price formed at this level makes it possible to cover
most of the costs of doing business, thus also preventing the
creation of a more significant quasi-fiscal deficit. The second
request of the IMF which remained unfulfilled prior to the talks — the regulation of the debt towards the
European Investment Bank, has also been resolved.
The draft agreement on the succession of republics of the former SFRY was adopted at the end of May.
According to the agreement, 38% or USD 1,024 million belongs to the FRY. Nevertheless, since a consider-
able part of this sum is in the form of claims in joint venture banks which are insolvent, it is realistic to expect
the sum of USD 378 million in the form of monetary gold and hard currency in foreign banks, as well as the
mentioned share in joint venture banks, if they are solvent. This amount does not include the claims from
Russia resulting from the clearing account. At issue is the total sum of around USD 1.5 billion.
The key economic event, apart from the donorsÕ conference, will quite certainly be talks with creditors
on which the manner in which the foreign financial gap is to be bridged will depend, and on which, in turn,
long-term economic growth will depend.
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